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Is EU Supranational Governance a 
Challenge to Liberal Constitutionalism? 
Gráinne de Búrca† 
Does supranational governance present a challenge to liberal constitutional-
ism? More particularly, has the European Union’s supranational form of govern-
ance fueled the rise of illiberal authoritarianism and undermined liberal constitu-
tionalism? This Essay first addresses two related empirical questions associated 
with this larger query: first, whether the Brexit vote reflected a rise in authoritar-
ianism and a turn against liberal constitutionalism; and second, whether the 
Euroscepticism to which the process of European integration has given rise has also 
contributed to the growth of the illiberal far right across the European Union and to 
the weakening of support for liberal constitutionalism. The third part addresses a 
broader and more conceptual question about the relationship between suprana-
tional governance and liberal constitutionalism—namely, whether there is some-
thing either inherent or contingent in the structure and process of European integra-
tion and in the project of European supranational governance that creates a 
challenge to liberal constitutionalism and, if so, what kind of challenge. 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union was founded in the 1950s as an experi-
ment in postwar regional integration, in part to help rebuild 
national economies damaged by World War II through economic 
integration, and in part to ward off, by means of closer legal and 
political integration of states, the threat of totalitarianism and 
Soviet expansion.1 For a number of decades the experiment in 
European integration made considerable progress toward these 
goals, deepening economic, legal, and political integration at the 
same time as it expanded to include many of the Central and 
Eastern Europe Countries (CEEC).2 The project of eastward 
expansion also meant that the European Union came to be viewed 
 
 † Florence Ellinwood Allen Professor of Law, NYU Law School. I am grateful to 
Thomas Streinz and the participants at The University of Chicago Law Review Symposium 
on The Limits of Constitutionalism in May 2017 and the Philosophy Colloquium at NYU 
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 1 For an analysis of the origins of the European Union, see generally Alan S. 
Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (Routledge 1992). 
 2 See generally Marise Cremona, ed, The Enlargement of the European Union 
(Oxford 2003). 
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not just as a project of economic and political integration of 
Western Europe, but also one of democratization and democracy 
promotion. 
The imposition of a form of political conditionality on the pro-
cess of accession to the European Union had begun in the 1970s 
and 1980s when Spain, Portugal, and Greece were admitted fol-
lowing periods of domestic dictatorship.3 This process was ex-
panded and formalized in the 1990s with the adoption of the 
Copenhagen criteria by the EU heads of state in the European 
Council prior to the opening of accession negotiations with the 
CEEC.4 These criteria are a set of requirements that commit all 
states seeking to join the European Union to respect the princi-
ples on which it is founded—namely, “the principles of liberty, de-
mocracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and of the rule of law”5—and that are now enshrined in Article 49 
and Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).6 Fur-
ther, since 1997, the TEU has included a procedure, known as the 
Article 7 sanction mechanism, that provides for the possible sus-
pension of voting rights of an EU member state that seriously and 
persistently breaches these principles.7 
In other words, the European Union, as it stands today, 
seems to be designed at least in part to protect and promote 
democracy and liberal constitutionalism, rather than to under-
mine or weaken it. Why then do we need to pose the question 
whether supranational governance presents a challenge to liberal 
constitutionalism? A first answer is that the European Union—
particularly since the time of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, 
which heralded the move from an “economic community” to a 
 
 3 See generally Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, Legacies and Leverage: 
EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective, 62 Eur-
Asia Stud 443 (2010); Viljar Veebel, European Union’s Positive Conditionality Model in 
Pre-accession Process, 13 Trames 207, 213–20 (2009). 
 4 See European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency *13 (June 21–22, 1993), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/42XZ-8YLS (“Membership requires that the candidate country 
has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union.”). 
 5 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 55 J EU C326 13, 15 
(2012) (“TEU”). 
 6 See TEU Arts 6(1), 49, 55 J EU C326 at 19, 43. 
 7 TEU Art 7, 55 J EU C326 at 19–20. 
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more ambitious political union with a single currency8—has ex-
perienced a series of ongoing challenges to its legitimacy, includ-
ing recurrent allegations of a “democratic deficit.” Secondly, the 
European Union over the past decade has been roiled by a series 
of even sharper crises, including the Euro crisis and the refugee 
crisis, leading to a set of challenges that go well beyond the 
democratic-deficit critique. Among them is the rise within many 
member states of Eurosceptical political movements, in some 
cases accompanied by a growth in support for illiberal authori-
tarian government, as seen most strikingly in Poland and 
Hungary. 
Further, the Brexit vote of a majority of the UK population in 
2016 to leave the European Union has presented another major 
problem for the European Union. The apparent similarities be-
tween the wider move against liberal constitutionalism described 
in the Symposium Introduction9 and some of the causes and man-
ifestations of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom raise the 
question whether the vote itself can be understood as part of this 
wider move away from liberal constitutionalism and toward in-
creasingly authoritarian rule. 
In what follows, three questions are addressed. The first is 
whether the Brexit vote can indeed be understood as part of the 
move away from liberal constitutionalism, or whether this 
claim overstates the similarity between the UK vote to leave 
the European Union and the erosion of constitutional democracy 
in other states. The second is whether the EU project of regional 
integration may be partly responsible for the rise of authoritari-
anism and the decline in support for liberal constitutionalism 
within several of the EU member states. The third and final ques-
tion is whether the EU form of supranational governance itself 
presents a challenge to liberal constitutionalism, as defined in the 
Symposium Introduction.10 
 
 8 Maastricht Treaty Title II, 35 J EU C191 1, 5 (1992). 
 9 See Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq, and Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal 
Constitutionalism?, 85 U Chi L Rev 239, 239–42 (2018). 
 10 Professors Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq, and Mila Versteeg have described liberal 
constitutionalism as entailing: a written constitution including an enumeration of individ-
ual rights; the existence of rights-based judicial review; a heightened threshold for consti-
tutional amendment; a commitment to persisting democratic elections; and a commitment 
to the rule of law, understood as ensuring that administrative and adjudicative func-
tions that operate autonomously from, and potentially limit, powerful factions or leaders. 
Id at 239. 
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I.  DID THE BREXIT VOTE REFLECT A DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR 
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
On one interpretation, the vote of a majority of the popula-
tion of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union had 
little to do with a rejection of liberal constitutionalism. The 
strongly Eurosceptic sentiment that underpinned much of the 
“leave” vote—a sentiment that has been prominent in the United 
Kingdom since it first joined the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1973, fluctuating at times but rising in recent years11—
was skeptical of the European Union and the benefits of European 
integration, but not necessarily skeptical of Britain’s traditional 
democratic system. The strongest two factors that appear to have 
led those voting against EU membership to do so were specific 
concerns over immigration and a more general desire to regain 
“control,” including control of the economy, of borders, and of law-
making.12 Indeed, a popular referendum is certainly at least one 
dimension of democracy in practice, albeit one which can be in 
tension with elements of representative democracy or with minor-
ity rights and other constitutional guarantees. And the design of 
the Brexit referendum has been criticized on account of its fail-
ure to build in safeguards like a supermajority requirement or a 
“double-lock threshold” to reflect the role of the devolved regions 
in the UK.13 Nevertheless, the concerns over immigration and 
desire for greater national control that were reflected in the 
British vote to leave the European Union do not necessarily 
imply a rejection of liberal constitutionalism or a vote for illib-
eral authoritarianism. 
Indeed, the Brexit vote could reasonably be understood as the 
almost inevitable consequence of the immense gamble of putting to 
a popular vote (on perhaps any number of occasions over the past 
thirty years) the question of UK membership in the European 
Union. Despite the shock with which the result of the vote was 
 
 11 See Roger Mortimore, Polling History: 40 Years of British Views on ‘In or Out’ of 
Europe (The Conversation, June 21, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/U245-DH3Q. 
 12 See Brexit Britain: British Election Study Insights from the Post-EU Referendum 
Wave of the BES Internet Panel (British Election Study, June 10, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7SZ4-NZXG; Matthew J. Goodwin and Oliver Heath, The 2016 Referen-
dum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-Level Analysis of the Result, 87 Polit Q 323, 
324–25 (2016). 
 13 See Allan F. Tatham, “The Art of Falling Apart?”: Constitutional Conundrums 
Surrounding a Potential Brexit *6–7 (CSF-SSSUP Working Paper Series, Feb 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/XF3Z-BC9Q; Kenneth Rogoff, Britain’s Democratic Failure 
(Project Syndicate, June 24, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/TM5D-HGG8. 
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greeted, it was in many respects a predictable outcome given how 
continuously contested and difficult the United Kingdom’s rela-
tionship with the European Union has been ever since it joined. 
The United Kingdom initially sought EU membership for largely 
pragmatic economic reasons rather than any commitment to be-
ing part of a European political unity.14 Throughout its more than 
forty-year membership, Britain never subscribed to or supported 
the vision of European integration accepted by many, if not most, 
other member states. 
On the contrary, the United Kingdom adopted a pragmatic 
and often ad hoc approach to its EU membership, with numerous 
opt-outs and special treatment sought over the years. While other 
member states expressed reservations at various times about as-
pects of EU policy and sought occasional opt-outs for particular 
interests and issues,15 the United Kingdom nonetheless remained 
quite exceptional if not exceptionalist in its attitude toward the 
European Union, and the attitude of its government in general 
largely reflected public opinion. Britain sought and received spe-
cial treatment in relation to the so-called EU budget rebate,16 and 
it adopted a pragmatic, case-by-case approach to the introduction 
of new areas of EU policy. Thus, the United Kingdom secured opt-
outs on a range of issues on which it was unwilling to countenance 
closer integration. Notably, these included reprieves from eco-
nomic and monetary union (EMU) and Justice and Home Affairs 
at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, with other shorter-lived or 
less successful attempts seen in the Social Protocol attached to 
the Maastricht Treaty17 and the more recent Protocol on the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights attached to the Lisbon Treaty.18 
 
 14 See Nauro Campos and Fabrizio Coricelli, Why Did Britain Join the EU? A New In-
sight from Economic History (Vox EU, Feb 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SS7K-PR3N. 
 15 Denmark and Ireland, for example, have chosen to opt out from some of the EU 
provisions on Justice and Home Affairs, and Denmark and Sweden have chosen to remain 
outside the euro. Various other minor opt-outs have been secured from time to time by 
other EU members, but no member state has requested and obtained the number and 
range of opt-outs that the United Kingdom consistently has. See Mark Briggs, Europe ‘à 
la Carte’: The Whats and Whys behind UK Opt-Outs (Euractiv, May 12, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8B9J-ZG3R. 
 16 See generally Alessandro D’Alfonso, The UK ‘Rebate’ on the EU Budget: An Expla-
nation of the Abatement and Other Correction Mechanisms (European Parliamentary 
Research Service, Feb 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/73S7-KEQG. 
 17 See, for example, Brian Towers, Two Speed Ahead: Social Europe and the UK after 
Maastricht, 23 Indust Rel J 83, 85 (1992); Gerda Falkner, The Maastricht Protocol on So-
cial Policy: Theory and Practice, 6 J Eur Soc Pol 1, 9–10 (1996). 
 18 See generally Catherine Barnard, The ‘Opt-Out’ for the UK and Poland from the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?, in Stefan Griller and 
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Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom, as evidenced also by 
opinion poll research,19 has long predated the current wave of pop-
ulism sweeping the democratic world,20 and it has expressed itself 
for the most part not as a rejection of liberal democratic values 
but as something that could even be presented as the opposite: a 
refusal to be “ruled from abroad,” as voters understood it, and 
a rejection of the primacy of “continental” and unresponsive 
European supranational law over domestic constitutional law and 
domestic democratic institutions. On this reading, despite the 
similarity in the salience of the issues of immigration, economic 
insecurity, and nationalism, the Brexit vote to leave the European 
Union might perhaps not be so easily categorized with the various 
political movements in other European states and the United 
States that seem to challenge core aspects of constitutional de-
mocracy and to advance illiberal populism. Despite the antisys-
tem flavor of the referendum, the apparent wish of many of 
those who voted for Brexit could be said to have been to reject 
the European Union’s role in the United Kingdom, rather than to 
replace or undermine aspects of the British democratic and con-
stitutional system. 
Yet at the same time, this first interpretation of the Brexit 
referendum overlooks various features of the vote and particu-
larly the nature of the issues that fanned the flames of the long-
standing, latent Euroscepticism that eventually led to a majority 
vote in favor of withdrawal from the European Union. Certain as-
pects of the vote and its underlying causes resonate clearly with 
what was referred to in the Symposium Introduction as the 
“right-leaning populist explosion” across Europe and Asia.21 
While the Brexit debate in the United Kingdom did not generally 
entail calls or proposals to repudiate liberal norms of tolerance, 
restrict press freedom, or undermine the rule of law, certain 
dimensions of the vote to leave—and perhaps particularly the di-
mensions that tipped the balance this time toward a “no” vote—
suggest that important elements of the illiberal populism evident 
 
Jacques Ziller, eds, The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional 
Treaty? 257 (SpringerWienNewYork 2008). 
 19 See Mortimore, Polling History (cited in note 11). 
 20 See generally Anthony Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Poli-
tics: Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945 
(Routledge 2002). 
 21 See Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 240 (cited in note 9) (quota-
tion marks omitted). 
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elsewhere in Europe and beyond were present also in the UK de-
bate and in the size of the vote to leave. 
In the first place, various analyses of the British vote post-
referendum indicate that the issue of immigration and the prev-
alence of anti-immigrant sentiment played a very significant role 
in the vote.22 While concern over immigration is not necessarily 
illiberal, widespread anti-immigrant sentiment during the Brexit 
campaign erupted regularly into xenophobic discourse and rac-
ism, as was widely reported in the British media at the time.23 
Further, according to police records, the period following the ref-
erendum vote showed a sharp rise in hate crimes directed at mi-
grants and refugees.24 
In the second place, a clear correlation between anti-EU sen-
timent and attachment to authoritarian values was identified in 
a number of post-referendum studies of the Brexit vote. In par-
ticular, it seems that 66 percent of those who voted to leave the 
European Union identified themselves as having values that were 
coded as “authoritarian” on the authoritarian–libertarian scale.25 
Attachment to these authoritarian values was revealed in re-
sponses to a range of questions, such as those concerning how 
children should be raised and attitudes toward the death penalty, 
 
 22 See Kirby Swales, Understanding the Leave Vote *13 (NatCen Social Research, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/X5ES-2MFF; Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin, and 
Paul Whiteley, Why Britain Voted for Brexit: An Individual-Level Analysis of the 2016 
Referendum Vote, 70 Parliamentary Aff 439, 453 (2017). 
 23 See, for example, Brett Arends, Brexit Campaign Devolves into Racism and Xeno-
phobia (MarketWatch, June 15, 2016), online at http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/brexit-campaign-devolves-into-racism-and-xenophobia-2016-06-15 (visited Dec 13, 
2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 24 See Jon Burnett, Racial Violence and the Brexit State *13 (Institute of Race 
Relations, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/G45C-BKY3. For media reports, see 
Katie Forster, Hate Crimes Soared by 41% after Brexit Vote, Official Figures Reveal 
(The Independent, Oct 13, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8WGV-WSXT; Homa 
Khaleeli, ‘A Frenzy of Hatred’: How to Understand Brexit Racism (The Guardian, June 29, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/S7LT-BPTJ. 
 25 See Swales, Understanding the Leave Vote at *16 (cited in note 22). See also Eric 
Kaufmann, It’s NOT the Economy, Stupid: Brexit as a Story of Personal Values (London 
School of Economics, July 7, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/64C6-7BF2. Political values 
in the United Kingdom have for some decades been measured by social scientists on a 
libertarian–authoritarian scale as well as a left–right scale, see, for example, UK Parties 
2017 General Election (Political Compass, Aug 22, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7SR4-LYTJ, and it seems that the libertarian–authoritarian cleavage was 
much more significant in the Brexit vote than the left–right cleavage. 
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but also in responses indicating a preference in certain circum-
stances for order over personal freedom.26 
Thirdly, in the aftermath of the vote to leave the European 
Union, a more vocally illiberal element has been present in the 
public debate. There were extraordinary verbal attacks by the 
popular tabloid press on the judiciary. Headlines proclaimed the 
judges of the High Court to be “enemies of the people” following 
the R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union27 
case.28 Miller declared that a decision to trigger Article 50 of the 
TEU, which would begin the countdown to withdrawal, required 
a parliamentary vote.29 Further, there has been intense pressure 
to effectively entrench the result of the (nonbinding) referendum 
vote and to treat any debate or discussion of the merits of the vote 
as a betrayal of the people’s voice.30 
Fourthly, one of the sources of opposition to the European 
Union among an important category of pro-Brexit voters was the 
role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and its rulings on the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.31 This objection to European 
adjudication of issues raising human-rights claims in the United 
Kingdom, and its prominence in the Brexit debate, extended also 
to the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
in Strasbourg, which although not formally part of the EU system 
is closely linked to it. Thus Theresa May—in her capacity as 
 
 26 The issues on which they were asked whether they agreed or disagreed included 
the following: (1) Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British val-
ues; (2) People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences; (3) For some crimes, 
the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence; (4) Schools should teach children to 
obey authority; (5) The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong; 
(6) Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards. See Swales, 
Understanding the Leave Vote at *28 (cited in note 22). 
 27 [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin). 
 28 See James Slack, Enemies of the People: Fury over ‘Out of Touch’ Judges Who Have 
‘Declared War on Democracy’ by Defying 17.4m Brexit Voters and Who Could Trigger Con-
stitutional Crisis (Daily Mail, Nov 4, 2016), online at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ 
article-3903436/Enemies-people-Fury-touch-judges-defied-17-4m-Brexit-voters-trigger 
-constitutional-crisis.html (visited Oct 16, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 29 Miller, [2016] EWHC 2768 at ¶¶ 92–93. The judgment of the Supreme Court on 
appeal was given on January 24, 2017. See R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union, [2017] UKSC 5. 
 30 See Anatole Kaletsky, Tony Blair’s Democratic Insurrection (Project Syndicate, 
Feb 24, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/A6SA-CQDM. 
 31 An influential blog article published in February 2016 by Marina Wheeler, a senior 
lawyer and the spouse of Boris Johnson, the then–London mayor who led the Brexit cam-
paign, argued that the power of the ECJ had been extended too far by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. See Marina Wheeler, Cavalier with Our Constitution: A Charter Too 
Far (UK Human Rights Blog, Feb 9, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/K8QV-8UJD. 
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then–Home Secretary in April 2016—called for UK withdrawal 
from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and 
despite mixed messages from the British government on this sub-
ject since that time, the question of withdrawal from the ECHR, 
repeal of the UK Human Rights Act, and rejection of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
have been treated as closely related in the Brexit and post-
Brexit debate.32 
Hence the Brexit vote, while on a first analysis may not 
appear to have much in common with the spread of illiberal 
authoritarianism in countries like Poland and Hungary, does 
share a number of relevant features, including (i) a strong anti-
immigration and anti-immigrant dimension, (ii) an increasingly 
publicly expressed intolerance (fueled by the tabloid media) to-
ward dissent or disagreement with the voice of the “people” as 
taken to be expressed by the June 2016 vote, (iii) the fact that a 
majority of those who were identified in a poll as adhering to 
authoritarian values voted for Brexit, and (iv) a rejection of human-
rights adjudication by European courts. The British political sys-
tem did not move toward becoming an illiberal authoritarian re-
gime in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, but many of the elements 
that have come to prominence in other states and that have fueled 
the rise of illiberal regimes in those other countries were also pre-
sent in the United Kingdom, with the vote revealing a very di-
vided society sharply split between those on the authoritarian 
and those on the liberal side of the political spectrum. The risk 
recently articulated by several political science scholars that the 
discourse, policies, and preferences of the vocal far right (includ-
ing their populist illiberalism) is likely to strongly influence the 
programs and actions of mainstream and centrist parties, is 
clearly present in the post-Brexit United Kingdom.33 
 
 32 See Anushka Asthana and Rowena Mason, UK Must Leave European Convention 
on Human Rights, Says Theresa May (The Guardian, Apr 25, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/J3DD-9VJH; Ed Bates, Is the UK Going to Withdraw from the ECHR? 
What about the Human Rights Act? (ukstrasbourgspotlight, Mar 10, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/CX8U-LBFR. For an analysis by the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Human Rights, see generally House of Common and House of Lords Joint Committee 
on Human Rights, The Human Rights Implications of Brexit (Dec 19, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/U3V9-NEHV. 
 33 See Cas Mudde, On Extremism and Democracy in Europe 145–48 (Routledge 
2016). Professor Cas Mudde warns that democracy in Europe is under threat from the 
liberal elite, who are choosing to adapt their programs and policies (on issues such as 
migration, refugees, and multiculturalism) to the agenda of the far right in order to win 
voters. 
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These elements in the Brexit debate, however, do not neces-
sarily establish that the European Union presents a challenge to 
liberal constitutionalism, even if they indicate that a significant part 
of the opposition to the European Union in the United Kingdom was 
illiberal in nature, involving a strong reaction against migration 
and migrants, and against rights adjudication by European 
judges, and toward the identification of the Brexit majority vote 
as the true voice of the people. The question whether the process 
of European integration has generated such reactions elsewhere 
in the European Union is explored in the next Part. 
II.  HAS EU INTEGRATION PLAYED A PART IN THE RISE IN 
SUPPORT FOR ILLIBERAL AUTHORITARIAN PARTIES ACROSS 
MEMBER STATES AND A DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
It is certainly clear that the process of European integration 
has given rise to political and social movements opposed to the 
European Union and to the project of integration, a phenomenon 
that is commonly known as Euroscepticism.34 One empirical ques-
tion arising from this fact is whether the growth of Euroscepticism 
in response to European integration has fueled the decline in 
support for liberal constitutionalism and the rise of illiberal 
authoritarianism. 
This is a complex question, and one that cannot be answered 
with any degree of accuracy without careful empirical analysis of 
a range of countries over time. For present purposes, I will simply 
identify and describe a set of distinct phenomena that bear on the 
question, and consider some of the possible relationships between 
them. There are at least three movements or sets of developments 
across various states of the European Union that seem relevant 
to the question. The first is the steady growth of Euroscepticism 
over several decades, the second is the gradual rise of the far right 
across Europe, and the third is the more general turn in many 
European countries (including EU states) against what has been 
described as global neoliberal capitalism. 
The first of these, the rise of Euroscepticism, has been the 
subject of intensive study and analysis since the mid-1990s, when 
it initially began to manifest in the aftermath of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the move from the EEC to the European Union. The 
 
 34 For an early collection of essays on Eurosceptical thought, see generally Martin 
Holmes, ed, The Eurosceptical Reader (St. Martin’s 1996). 
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opposition that began to grow was, in a sense, a challenge to the 
elite consensus in favor of European integration that had pre-
vailed since the 1950s, together with the assumption of a popular 
“permissive consensus” accompanying this elite support.35 With 
the introduction of economic and monetary union, a common for-
eign and security policy, and an aspiration toward political union 
in the Maastricht treaty in 1993, political opposition toward the 
European Union began to develop in earnest.36 Since that time, 
Euroscepticism—and particularly what has been termed “hard” 
Euroscepticism entailing opposition to the very idea of European 
integration, rather than “soft” Euroscepticism entailing objection 
to some of the EU policies and direction—has continued to rise 
steadily.37 This Euroscepticism has not been the domain exclu-
sively of the right or the far right, however. On the contrary, there 
has always been a strand of Euroscepticism on the left.38 Never-
theless, left-wing Euroscepticism has been a less prominent 
strand than that of the Eurosceptical right, and unlike right-
wing Euroscepticism, which has generally opposed the project of 
European integration, left-wing Euroscepticism has broadly been 
in favor of reform of the European Union rather than outright 
opposition to its existence.39 
However, with the two major crises that hit the European Un-
ion from 2007 onwards—first, the European debt and banking cri-
sis, followed by the refugee and migrant crisis—Euroscepticism 
has grown more steeply, in particular the harder variety that op-
poses European integration per se rather than seeking reform of 
the European Union.40 The issues that appear most regularly to 
 
 35 See Ian Down and Carole J. Wilson, From ‘Permissive Consensus’ to ‘Constraining 
Dissensus’: A Polarizing Union?, 43 Acta Politica 26, 46 (2008). 
 36 For an important early paper, see generally Paul Taggart, A Touchstone of Dissent: 
Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems, 33 Eur J Polit Rsrch 
363 (1998). 
 37 See Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Oppo-
sition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation *6–8 (Sussex European Institute Working 
Paper No 36, Oct 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/SQ7A-86GT. For a challenge to the 
hard/soft classification, see Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, Two Sides of Euroscepticism: 
Party Positions on European Integration in Central Europe, 3 EU Polit 297, 300 (2002). 
 38 See Maurits J. Meijers, Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism: A Dy-
namic Phenomenon *6–7 (Jacques Delors Institut Berlin, Apr 7 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/F4Y4-RCWY. 
 39 See Erika J. van Elsas, Armen Hakhverdian, and Wouter van der Brug, United 
against a Common Foe? The Nature and Origins of Euroscepticism among Left-Wing and 
Right-Wing Citizens, 39 W Eur Polit 1181, 1186 (2016). 
 40 For some of the media commentary on the results of the 2014 European Parliament 
elections, see Eurosceptic ‘Earthquake’ Rocks EU Elections (BBC, May 26, 2014), archived 
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underpin Euroscepticism today are an overall objection to the di-
lution of national sovereignty and a belief that freer transnational 
economic exchange in general and immigration in particular are 
exacerbating economic insecurity and cultural disruption. At the 
same time, it seems that the issue of support for (or opposition to) 
European integration emerged, like globalism versus national-
ism, as a new and distinct social cleavage that has not easily been 
internalized or prioritized by traditional political parties whose 
core programs did not adapt to reflect its salience.41 New parties, 
on the other hand, arose rapidly in response to this emerging so-
cietal cleavage and adopted strong and sometimes extreme 
stances on it, and hence have attracted voters who were dissatis-
fied by the failure of traditional and mainstream parties to reflect 
their views on the issue.42 
The second development has been the gradual rise of the far-
right movement and far-right political parties across Europe. 
This resurgence, which has been taking place over a number of 
decades, has also generated an extensive academic literature, 
much of which seeks to understand how a political movement that 
was banished to the fringes after the defeat of Nazism following 
World War II has reemerged considerably strengthened in many 
European states and what the factors are which have led to its 
reemergence.43 Theories include the successful reframing of the 
far right that took place through the marriage of fervent nation-
alism presented as authentic civic values,44 with populist hostility 
 
at http://perma.cc/JJ2C-4BGW. For an academic analysis, see Sarah B. Hobolt and 
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Vote in the 2014 European Parliament Elections, 44 Elec Stud 504, 505 (2016). 
 41 See Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: 
Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage, 25 J Eur Pub Pol 109, 119–20 (2018). 
 42 For an analysis of the 2014 European Parliament elections in particular, when 
Eurosceptical parties won significant support, see Oliver Treib, The Voter Says No but 
Nobody Listens: Causes and Consequences of the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European 
Elections, 21 J Eur Pub Pol 1541, 1543–46 (2014). 
 43 For a few samples, see generally Roger Eatwell, The Rebirth of the ‘Extreme Right’ 
in Europe?, 53 Parliamentary Aff 407 (2000); John W.P. Veugelers, A Challenge for Polit-
ical Sociology: The Rise of Far-Right Parties in Contemporary Western Europe, 47 Current 
Sociology 78 (Oct 1999); Jens Rydgren, Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Ex-
plaining the Emergence of a New Party Family, 44 Eur J Polit Rsrch 413 (2005). See also 
Cas Mudde, Three Decades of Populist Right Parties in Europe: So What?, 52 Eur J Polit 
Rsrch 1, 8 (2013) (warning of the effect that the far right would have on the political spec-
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 44 See Daphne Halikiopoulou, Steven Mock, and Sofia Vasilopoulou, The Civic Zeit-
geist: Nationalism and Liberal Values in the European Radical Right, 19 Nations & 
Nationalism 107, 109 (2013). 
2018] Supranational Governance 349 
 
against the establishment and anti-immigrant sentiment, as well 
as the far right’s poaching of the economic policies of the social-
democrat left, including a shift toward embracing redistributive 
welfare policies (albeit for citizens only) and against policies of 
austerity.45 
The third relevant trend is the turn against so-called neolib-
eral capitalism.46 Unlike the other two trends described above, 
this development began as a clearly left-wing movement, 
spurred by intellectual critiques of capitalism and the global eco-
nomic order from writers like Professor Noam Chomsky, Susan 
George, Naomi Klein, and Professor Noreena Hertz, as well as 
former Washington insiders like Professor Joseph Stiglitz.47 The 
accompanying antiglobalization movement saw street protests 
against the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in 1999 
spread to various parts of the world, including to Europe, where 
organizations like Association for the Taxation of Financial 
Transactions and Aid to Citizens (ATTAC)48 and the European 
Social Forum were established.49 However, with the onset of the 
global financial crisis and the Euro crisis, the backlash against 
the policies of austerity promoted by international organizations 
 
 45 On the recent borrowing by far-right parties of the economic welfarist and anti-
austerity policies of the left, see Audrey Sheehy, The Rise of the Far Right (Harvard 
Political Review, Feb 11, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/T4GE-WH2H (“The far right 
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the rift in the left.”); Bojan Bugaric, Europe’s Nationalist Threat (American Prospect, May 
18, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/J39W-4FV4 (blaming the rise of populist right-wing 
parties on the moderate parties’ embrace of fiscal austerity). For a discussion of the rela-
tionship between economic insecurity and the rise of far-right parties, see generally Tim 
Vlandas and Daphne Halikiopoulou, Why Far Right Parties Do Well at Times of Crisis: 
The Role of Labour Market Institutions (European Trade Union Institute, July 2017), ar-
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Increasing Their Support across Europe? A Note on the French Election (HuffPost UK, Apr 
21, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/MH38-EXUM. 
 46 See generally David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford 2005). 
 47 See generally Noam Chomsky, Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order 
(Seven Stories 1999); Susan George, A Short History of Neoliberalism (Transnational 
Institute, Mar 24, 1999), archived at http://perma.cc/P9Y7-ARK6; Naomi Klein, This 
Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate (Simon & Schuster 2014); Noreena Hertz, 
The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy (HarperBusiness 
2003); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (Norton 2003). 
 48 Overview (ATTAC), archived at http://perma.cc/V39W-34J7. ATTAC describes it-
self as “an international organization involved in the alter-globalization movement. [It] 
oppose[s] neo-liberal globalization and develop[s] social, ecological, and democratic alter-
natives so as to guarantee fundamental rights for all.” It is best known for its advocacy of 
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 49 See Élise Féron, Anti-globalization Movements and the European Agenda: Between 
Dependence and Disconnection, 17 Eur J Soc Sci Rsrch 119, 120 (2004). 
350 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:337 
 
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European 
Union itself saw critiques of the global economic order spread well 
beyond their origins on the left. As already noted, opposition to 
austerity policies in various European states has more recently 
come from all sides of the political spectrum and not just from the 
left. Right-wing and far-right parties in countries including 
France, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have 
adopted antiglobalist and economically nationalist policies that 
reject austerity and promote statist economic policies centered on 
welfare.50 A relationship between economic insecurity and a rejec-
tion of globalism, including freer trade and open borders (and in-
cluding rejection of the European Union), has been suggested by 
a number of studies,51 even though cultural factors are also clearly 
relevant to the rise in nationalist sentiment in the European 
Union and elsewhere and to the rejection of internationalism.52 
Nevertheless, even if the Euro crisis helped to fuel support for 
extreme right-wing parties, it seems clear that the resurgence 
and growth of these parties significantly predated the economic 
crisis in the European Union, and that public hostility toward 
immigration was a more salient factor than economic disruption 
and austerity.53 
How should the relationship between these three sets of de-
velopments be understood, when seeking to address the question 
whether European integration has fueled the rise of illiberal au-
thoritarianism? It seems clear that Euroscepticism has been a 
feature of politics in many European states, most obviously since 
the time of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and that opposition to 
the European Union has been growing steadily in many member 
 
 50 See Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Populism: 
Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash *2 (Harvard Kennedy School Research Work-
ing Paper 16-026, Aug 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/GTK6-LG9A. 
 51 See, for example, Brian Burgoon, Inequality and Anti-globalization Backlash by 
Political Parties *14 (GINI Discussion Paper 14, Oct 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/BU6V-Y2JL; Anabel Kuntz, Eldad Davidov, and Moshe Semyonov, The 
Dynamic Relations between Economic Conditions and Anti-immigrant Sentiment: A Nat-
ural Experiment in Times of the European Economic Crisis, 58 Intl J Comp Sociology 392, 
396 (2017). See also generally Vlandas and Halikiopoulou, Why Far Right Parties Do Well 
at Times of Crisis (cited in note 45). 
 52 See Inglehart and Norris, Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Populism at *27 (cited in 
note 50). 
 53 See Matthew Goodwin, Europe’s Far Right: Don’t Blame the Eurozone Crisis 
(Chatham House, Aug 15, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/E6X4-6MCS; Emily Schultheis, 
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states for over two decades, rising through the more recent pe-
riod of the refugee crisis and economic crisis. However, it would 
not be correct to infer that opposition to the European Union, or 
Euroscepticism, provides the main explanation—or even a 
dominant explanation—for the rise and revival of the far right 
across Europe. Any easy inference of this kind is challenged by 
the evidence that the resurgence of the right in Europe has been 
a gradual trend unfolding over more than three decades, with or-
igins and causes well before the rise of Euroscepticism or opposi-
tion to the EU form of supranational governance had emerged.54 
At the same time, it is undeniable that far-right parties have ex-
ploited and benefited from the fact that mainstream parties 
across the European continent have been overwhelmingly support-
ive of European integration and that the growing nationalism–
globalism and national–European cleavages were not reflected 
adequately in the programs or policies of most of the traditional 
parties. 
Along these lines, Professor Renee Buhr has argued that ex-
tremist parties benefited from a social backlash against European 
integration in the post-Maastricht period, at a stage when virtu-
ally all mainstream parties supported European integration.55 In 
offering themselves as parties that provided a voice for concerns 
about EU integration, these parties of the extreme right (and 
some on the left that opposed EU membership or EU policies) ben-
efited electorally from the pro-integration consensus of the main-
stream parties. Further, the growing critique of neoliberal capi-
talism, which originated on the left of the political spectrum but 
spread to the right in particular after the global financial crisis, 
provided further grist to far-right parties that combine opposition 
to the European Union and its single-market policies with eco-
nomic and cultural nationalism. Hence the later and stronger 
backlash after 2009, in the wake of the Euro crisis and the 
broader economic crisis, against the market-liberalization and 
austerity policies of the European Union brought further support 
for far-right parties that also espoused and promoted populist 
illiberalism. 
A final point worth making is one that was raised by Professor 
Peter Mair in 2006 when he suggested that Euroscepticism was 
 
 54 See Eatwell, 53 Parliamentary Aff at 408–09 (cited in note 43); Mudde, 52 Eur J 
Polit Rsrch at 4 (cited in note 43). 
 55 See Renee L. Buhr, Seizing the Opportunity: Euroscepticism and Extremist Party 
Success in the Post-Maastricht Era, 47 Govt & Opposition 544, 550 (2012). 
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something more than opposition to or skepticism toward the 
European Union and its policies, but might be a form or species 
of a more general trend that he called “polity-scepticism.”56 By 
this he meant that Euroscepticism was not so much an objection 
to the European Union as a form of regional integration, but ac-
tually seemed to be part of a broader democratic malaise mani-
festing itself in a growing lack of political engagement by citizens, 
a disenchantment with politics and representative democracy, 
and a lack of electoral or party engagement.57 
To conclude, while there is clearly a relationship between op-
position to the European Union, Euroscepticism, and a growth in 
support for far-right parties that promote or espouse authoritar-
ian illiberalism, it would be overstating the evidence to suggest 
that European integration is responsible for the resurgence of 
such parties, and that supranational governance is thus prov-
ing to be a challenge to liberal constitutionalism. Nevertheless, 
Euroscepticism, together with a critique of global capitalism and 
economic neoliberalism (which the European Union is considered 
by at least a significant portion of its citizens to exemplify), and a 
more general disaffection with the political system that has been 
directed against the European Union as well as against main-
stream domestic politics, has helped authoritarian and illiberal 
parties to strengthen and expand. 
Quite apart from the question of whether opposition to or 
skepticism toward the European Union has fueled the rise in sup-
port for illiberal authoritarianism and the far right, however, is 
the more general question whether there is something in the pro-
ject and structure of European integration itself that poses a chal-
lenge to liberal constitutionalism. 
III.  IS THE PROJECT OF SUPRANATIONAL EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION A CHALLENGE TO LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
Has European integration undermined liberal constitutional-
ism? Or, put more positively, is there something about the project 
of supranational governance established by the European Union 
 
 56 See generally Peter Mair, Polity-Scepticism, Party Failings, and the Challenge 
to European Democracy (Netherland Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities 
and Social Sciences Uhlenbeck Lecture 24, June 9, 2006), archived at 
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 57 Id at *6. 
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that in itself poses a challenge to liberal constitutionalism, under-
stood in the terms described in the Symposium Introduction?58 To 
answer this question requires reflection on what the relationship 
of the European Union, considered as a form of supranational gov-
ernance, is to liberal constitutionalism in general, and to national 
liberal constitutionalism in particular. 
At least in its earliest form, when a draft treaty establishing 
a European Political Community was drawn up in 1952,59 the pro-
ject of European integration arguably resembled a continent-
wide experiment in liberal constitutionalism. Under the terms 
of the draft treaty there were to be political decisionmaking bod-
ies modeled on national federal systems; a bill of rights in the 
shape of the recently drafted ECHR was to be integrated into 
the European political community; and the ECtHR in Strasbourg 
was to be given jurisdiction over disputes arising under the new 
treaty.60 This was an early federal vision for an integrated 
European continent with a liberal democratic constitution and 
system of government. As is well known, however, that vision 
did not survive the rejection of the European Defence Treaty 
by France in 1953, and with it the draft European Political 
Community also disappeared.61 
As a consequence of the failed experiment with the European 
Defence Community and draft Political Community, the EEC, 
which was established some years later by the Treaty of Rome, 
was far from the fully fledged political community that had ear-
lier been envisaged. The 1957 Treaty of Rome was deliberately 
circumscribed in its scope and ambition, limited largely to the es-
tablishment of a common market, in part to avoid the fate that 
had befallen the earlier attempts at European integration.62 Nev-
ertheless, even in circumscribed form, the EEC reflected some of 
the embryonic elements of a liberal democratic political system. 
The EEC treaty included provision for a parliamentary assembly, 
which although not initially to be directly elected, contained a 
provision envisaging the introduction of direct elections at a later 
 
 58 See Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 239 (cited in note 9). 
 59 See generally Richard T. Griffiths, Europe’s First Constitution: The European Po-
litical Community, 1952–1954 (Federal Trust 2000); Gráinne de Búrca, The Road Not 
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 60 See de Búrca, 105 Am J Intl L at 654–55 (cited in note 59). 
 61 For a detailed history of France’s role in this chain of events, see generally Rogelia 
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Hist 386 (2006). 
 62 See de Búrca, 105 Am J Intl L at 664–65 (cited in note 59). 
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date.63 Nevertheless, the new supranational organs of govern-
ance—the Commission and the Council of Ministers—and the di-
vision of powers between them, did not amount to the kind of po-
litically accountable and representative government to be found 
within most of the EU member states at the time. Further, while 
a reasonably strong Court of Justice was created to adjudicate 
on disputes under the treaty, there was no mention of human 
rights, and despite the provision for judicial review of acts of the 
European Community, access to judicial review for individuals 
was fairly limited through restrictive locus standi provisions.64 By 
comparison with the earlier draft European Political Community 
treaty, any express reference to human rights or to the ECHR was 
omitted from the EEC treaty. 
Over the decades that followed, in a set of developments that 
is by now well known, the European Parliament gradually be-
came a directly elected body and eventually gained significant 
lawmaking powers in conjunction with the Council of Ministers.65 
Around the same time the ECJ, after initial hesitation in a num-
ber of cases that unsuccessfully tried to introduce ideas of human 
rights from the German legal order into EU law,66 declared that 
fundamental rights were part of EU law as unwritten general 
principles of law, and this precipitated a period of gradual inte-
gration of human-rights provisions into the EU treaties and 
through ECJ case law.67 Almost forty years after the creation of 
the European Economic, Coal and Steel, and Atomic Energy 
communities, the Maastricht Treaty transformed the European 
Communities into the European Union. This was a union with its 
own currency and a powerful lawmaking parliament, a union that 
introduced a form of European citizenship for all member-state 
nationals.68 The new TEU introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 
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contained prominent references to the ECHR and to the general 
principles of EU law. In other words, even while the language of 
statehood continued to be consciously avoided,69 the European 
Union began to emerge as a real political union and to resemble 
a system of liberal constitutionalism on a European scale. 
A debate on whether the European Union had a constitution, 
or could be considered as a constitutional order, which until then 
had been the preserve of a few academic lawyers, began in earnest 
after the Maastricht Treaty,70 and continued apace until the 2004 
decision of the heads of state and government of the European 
Union to establish a convention tasked with the drafting of a 
treaty establishing a constitution for Europe.71 The drafting of 
this treaty establishing a constitution for Europe proved in retro-
spect to be the high point of European constitutionalism thus 
far, and the rejection of the treaty by popular referendum in the 
Netherlands and France in 2005 signaled the end of the explicit 
constitutional vision for the European Union.72 Such a defeat for 
the treaty by way of a popular vote in two of the founding states 
of the European Union meant that the formal EU constitutional 
project was abandoned and the treaty remained unratified. Nev-
ertheless, after a number of years of reflection and discussion 
among the EU heads of state and government, the bulk of the 
draft constitutional treaty, albeit shorn of the symbolic constitu-
tional provisions that were taken to have been offensive to the 
people of France and the Netherlands, was enacted into law as 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.73 
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While academic and public debate as to whether the European 
Union had or needed a constitution abated for some time after the 
failure of the constitutional treaty, one of the underlying ques-
tions from that earlier debate remained particularly salient: Was 
the European Union in fact a constitutional order? One prominent 
strand of scholarly literature following the Maastricht Treaty cen-
tered around a debate about whether or not the European Union 
has a demos.74 The gist of the “no demos” argument was that be-
cause the European Union did not itself have a demos (a suffi-
ciently unified people), it lacked the preconditions for genuine 
democratic legitimacy as a polity.75 This view was contested, and 
various competing theories of EU democracy—including the idea 
that the European Union is best considered as a “demoicracy”—
were advanced.76 And yet, despite the ongoing debate about the 
EU’s democratic legitimacy and democratic deficit,77 it seemed by 
the time of the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty that the European 
Union had come to include most of the other main elements of 
a liberal constitutional system. It has a written constitution-
like set of treaties, including a Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The ECJ conducts rights-based judicial review, and the European 
Parliament is directly elected. The treaties include a commitment 
 
 74 See generally, for example, Mette Jolly, A Demos for the European Union?, 25 
Polit 12 (2005). 
 75 See J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the 
German Maastricht Decision, 1 Eur L J 219, 222–24 (1995). 
 76 See generally, for example, Vivien A. Schmidt, Democracy and Legitimacy in the 
European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput,’ 61 Polit Stud 2 (2013); Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis, The Idea of European Demoicracy, in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis, 
eds, Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law 247 (Oxford 2012). 
 77 For one of the classic debates on the European Union’s “democratic deficit,” see 
generally Andreas Føllesdal and Simon Hix, Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: 
A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J Common Mkt Stud 533 (2006); Giandomenico 
Majone, Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards, 4 Eur L J 5 (1998); 
Andrew Moravcsik, The Myth of Europe’s “Democratic Deficit,” 43 Intereconomics 331 
(2008). For some more recent contributions, see generally Antoine Vauchez, Democratizing 
Europe (Palgrave 2016); Richard Bellamy and Sandra Kröger, Domesticating the Demo-
cratic Deficit? The Role of National Parliaments and Parties in the EU’s System of Govern-
ance, 67 Parliamentary Aff 437 (2012). Recently the debate on the European Union’s “dem-
ocratic deficit” has moved beyond the realm of academic scholarship and into the 
mainstream media. See, for example, Jennifer Rankin, Is the EU Undemocratic? (The 
Guardian, June 13, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/T8W8-EZA4; How to Address the 
EU’s Democratic Deficit (The Economist, Mar 23, 2017), online at http://www 
.economist.com/news/special-report/21719196-institutions-need-reform-how-address-eus 
-democratic-deficit (visited Oct 16, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable); Amanda Taub, The 
E.U. Is Democratic. It Just Doesn’t Feel That Way (NY Times, June 29, 2016), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/world/europe/the-eu-is-democratic-it-just-doesnt 
-feel-that-way.html?_r=1 (visited Oct 16, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
2018] Supranational Governance 357 
 
to the rule of law (including a rule-of-law mechanism for disciplin-
ing states),78 and power is distributed across the various institu-
tions in such a way as would appear to prevent any one institution 
from dominating or concentrating power. Nevertheless, despite 
parliamentary elections, a powerful European Parliament, demo-
cratically elected representatives in the Council of Ministers, a 
legally enshrined principle of transparency, a strong EU court, 
and various layers of legal and constitutional rights protection, 
the European Union still lacks real responsiveness to the prefer-
ences of its citizens.79 
Hence, as far as its democratic credentials are concerned, 
there is an ongoing debate about the quality of democracy in 
the European Union, focusing particularly on whether there is 
a European people and on the lack of adequate responsiveness to 
citizens within the EU system of governance. At the same time, 
however, and despite this debate about its democratic responsive-
ness, the EU political system nonetheless includes and embodies 
many of the key features of liberal constitutionalism. Indeed the 
European Union formally insists, under Articles 2, 7, and 49 of 
the TEU, on a commitment on the part of all of its member states 
to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and has wrestled 
in recent years with the question of how it should tackle demo-
cratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland.80 In other words, de-
spite contestation over the quality of democracy, the European 
Union in the main is constructed as, and contains the main ele-
ments of, a liberal constitutional political system. Why then pose 
the question whether the structure and functioning of European 
supranational governance poses a risk to liberal constitutional-
ism? If the European Union is founded on the values of democ-
racy, human rights, and the rule of law, and seeks to condition 
accession to the European Union on adherence to these values, 
how can it pose a challenge to them? 
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One main reason is the risk that, whatever the strength and 
quality of its own constitutional features and institutional struc-
tures, the functioning of the European Union may nonetheless 
undermine rather than support or enhance the democratic consti-
tutional systems of member states.81 There are a number of dif-
ferent if related dimensions of this risk. A first is the impact to 
date of the articulation by the ECJ of a broad and fairly uncom-
promising principle of supremacy of EU law over national law. 
One particular aspect of this concern that has recently been ar-
ticulated is the issue of national identity, and the question 
whether European integration in general and the operation of the 
supremacy principle in particular have undermined important 
aspects of national constitutional identity. A second concern is the 
general trend toward “executive dominance” in the European 
Union and its exacerbation by the technocratic and managerial 
workings of the EU supranational institutions. Thirdly, there is 
the impact of the European Union’s prioritization of its project of 
economic liberalization over other domestic and transnational 
goals, and particularly its impact on the functioning of national 
social democracy. 
Beginning with the principle of the supremacy, the idea of 
the primacy of EU law over national law was first introduced by 
the ECJ in the early 1960s,82 and gradually took hold across the 
European Union.83 From as early as 1970, the court insisted on 
the supremacy of EU law over all provisions of national law of 
whatever rank, including provisions of the national constitution.84 
Various aspects of the supremacy principle were challenged from 
the outset, with particular concern being expressed over the 
ECJ’s assertion that any binding and directly effective provision 
of EU law—whatever its content—must in the interests of uni-
formity of EU law take precedence over any provision of national 
constitutional law, even over basic constitutional rights. This 
claim has generated controversy and pushback from domestic 
constitutional courts ever since the first Solange judgment of the 
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Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford 2001). 
 84 See generally Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125. 
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Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German Constitutional Court, in 
1974.85 In that ruling, the court declared that the part of the con-
stitution dealing with basic rights was an inalienable essential 
feature of German constitutional law and that given the state of 
the European Union at the time (when it was still the EEC with 
fewer developed features of liberal constitutionalism, lacking a 
directly elected parliament or an entrenched bill of rights), the 
guarantees of basic rights in the German constitution would pre-
vail over EU law in the event of conflict.86 
And even though, as described above, the European Union has 
developed significantly since that time and currently has a pow-
erful directly elected parliament as well as a binding Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the controversy over the ECJ’s claim that EU 
law must prevail over domestic constitutional rights has continued, 
and a series of robust rulings have been given by a range of national 
constitutional courts, including the Bundesverfassungsgericht, ar-
ticulating limits to the operation of the principle of supremacy of 
EU law. Cases—such as the Melloni reference to the ECJ from 
the Spanish Constitutional Court involving a conflict between the 
provisions of the EU Arrest Warrant and the right to a fair trial 
in the Spanish Constitution,87 and the Taricco reference from the 
Italian Constitutional Court involving a conflict between the prin-
ciple of legality in Italian constitutional law and EU value-added-
tax law88—demonstrate that the kinds of concerns expressed in 
Solange I retain their significance. In other words, national 
courts and other constituencies are concerned that EU law may 
undermine domestic constitutional law by failing to respect the 
specificity or importance of particular rights and protections 
guaranteed as part of national constitutional law. 
A related and more recently articulated aspect of the concern 
over the operation of the supremacy principle is the question 
whether it has weakened or undermined the national constitu-
tional identity of EU member states. Liberal constitutionalism 
has until now been developed within the nation-state context, as 
a framework for the functioning of a healthy democratic political 
system, and national constitutions generally purport to embody 
or articulate elements of national identity. The European Union, 
 
 85 See generally Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle 
für Getreide und Futtermittel, [1974] 2 CMLR 540 (BVerfG) (“Solange I”). 
 86 Id at 550. 
 87 See generally Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, [2013] 2 CMLR 43 (ECJ). 
 88 See generally Taricco, [2016] 1 CMLR 21 (ECJ). 
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however, is not a nation-state, and although it has effectively es-
tablished a continent-wide system of liberal constitutionalism, its 
democratic system remains relatively weak and noncontestatory, 
and its identity is complex, contested, and polyphonous.89 Political 
and popular concern about the process of European integration 
undermining or weakening national identity,90 including national 
constitutional identity, resulted in the addition in 2010 of a new 
provision by the Lisbon Treaty (and previously by the unratified 
Constitutional Treaty) to the TEU. Article 4(2) of the TEU now 
provides that the European Union “shall respect the equality 
of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.”91 
This provision has already generated a voluminous academic 
literature, with many applauding the move to provide treaty-
based recognition and protection for national constitutional iden-
tities.92 Others, however, have noted the paradoxical risk that this 
provision may be invoked by governments like Hungary’s that are 
deliberately undermining liberal constitutional safeguards 
within their own political systems, and using the new provision 
in Article 4(2) to ward off attempts by the European Union or 
the ECJ to prevent them from doing so.93 Hence the impact of 
 
 89 See Janie Pélabay, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, and Justine Lacroix, Echoes and Polyph-
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the European Union on national constitutional identity, insofar 
as the question is whether it is likely to undermine liberal consti-
tutionalism rather than to bolster or support it, seems not to be a 
straightforwardly negative one. One way of expressing the rela-
tionship between the European Union and national constitutional 
identity is to accept that European integration has challenged na-
tional constitutional identity, but not necessarily in a negative 
way, and that it both supports the fundamental premises of lib-
eral constitutionalism while at the same time sometimes chal-
lenging aspects of the way in which liberal constitutionalism is 
interpreted in specific national contexts. 
A second aspect of the concern that the European Union is 
posing a challenge to domestic constitutional democracy relates 
to the problem of executive dominance. The suggestion that there 
may be a trade-off between democracy and transnational or global 
governance was made in a different context in 1971 by Karl Kai-
ser.94 While transnational cooperation and interdependence—
including in the EU context—has been a strongly positive force in 
all sorts of ways, the question is whether such interdependence, 
even if it has reduced war and increased human welfare in many 
ways, might also be linked with a weakening in the quality of ex-
isting state-based democratic governance. In the EU context, it 
has been argued that the process of integration has given rise to 
the gradual dominance of the executive branches, and has weak-
ened the role, cogency, and effectiveness of domestic democratic 
mechanisms and systems.95 Some have described the phenomenon 
more sharply as “collusive delegation” by national governments 
to transnational bodies and organizations, enabling governments 
and executives to work collectively at the European and interna-
tional level to achieve their goals in ways that deliberately bypass 
national democratic institutions, and increasing concern that Eu-
ropean (and global) governance institutions may be weakening or 
 
tion between national identity and constitutional identity, see Elke Cloots, National Iden-
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undermining domestic democratic systems.96 It might even be ar-
gued that moral hazard is built into the establishment of many 
international institutions, in that they allow or encourage domes-
tic policymakers to bypass domestic democratic institutions and 
disincentivize domestic democratic bodies from robust engage-
ment with policies that are perceived to be within the purview of 
transnational or foreign policy actors.97 
A third strand of the critique that the European Union is un-
dermining domestic constitutional democracy has been articu-
lated for some years since the Maastricht Treaty, in particular by 
a group of prominent German scholars including Professors Fritz 
Scharpf, Claus Offe, Wolfgang Streeck, and Christian Joerges, 
who focus on the way in which the EU treaties have promoted a 
particular ordoliberal vision. They argue that the EU promotion 
of transnational economic integration has prioritized “negative” 
integration, the dismantling of regulatory barriers to interstate 
trade, over positive integration to pursue welfare goals and pro-
tect social rights, and that this set of priorities has effectively 
been written into EU treaties in a way that is difficult to change 
and that overrides key domestic institutions and choices.98 A cen-
tral aspect of their concern is that the European Union lacks the 
institutional and social resources to pursue an active and ade-
quate Europe-wide social policy, and yet through its deregula-
tory and monetary policies has weakened the capacity of na-
tional social democracies to fulfill their goals and undermined the 
functioning of those democracies. After the onset of the Euro cri-
sis in 2009, the expansion of technocratic governance and the im-
position of austerity policies by the European Union and the IMF, 
which have had such profoundly negative social effects on debtor 
countries and particularly on Greece, added powerful grist and a 
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new dimension to these critiques.99 The fact that fundamental 
economic rules—whether free-movement and competition rules, 
or excessive deficit provisions—are written into the EU treaties 
and become effectively obligatory for member states means that 
the space for domestic politics and contestation over such issues 
is more or less closed. While this concern may seem to be more 
about the impact of EU economic integration goals on domestic 
welfare policies rather than its impact on liberal constitutional-
ism, the fact that social rights are written into the constitutions 
of some member states, or that the welfare state or social democ-
racy is an important component of the constitutional system of 
certain member states (as in the German constitution’s guarantee 
of a democratic and social federal state) brings the two issues 
closer together. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay began by reflecting on the relationship between 
the EU system of supranational governance, the rise of illiberal 
populism and authoritarianism, and the decline of liberal con-
stitutionalism. Having considered whether the Brexit vote—
which has been widely seen as a kind of populist revolt against 
a sovereignty-constraining European Union—was a part of this 
trend, I concluded that while certain elements underpinning the 
vote to leave the European Union reflected illiberal or authoritar-
ian tendencies, the Brexit decision overall cannot be said to rep-
resent a move against liberal constitutionalism or in favor of il-
liberal authoritarianism. Similarly, although the spread of 
Euroscepticism to which the deepening and expansion of 
European integration gave rise has benefited extreme right-wing 
movements and parties across Europe, the reemergence and 
growth of the far right in various European states had begun well 
before strong anti-EU sentiment became prevalent. Nevertheless, 
as elaborated in the previous Part, even though the European 
Union is itself now in many respects firmly committed to liberal 
constitutionalism and to promoting the spread of democracy and 
constitutionalism, the functioning of EU supranational govern-
ance has certainly challenged national constitutional institutions 
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and norms in various ways. In particular, the inadequate respon-
siveness of EU governance institutions to citizens, the judicial 
declaration of unconditional primacy of all EU laws over national 
constitutional rights, the growth of executive dominance and 
technocratic governance, and the bypassing of domestic parlia-
mentary and democratic institutions, as well as the weakening of 
state-based social democracy through the European Union’s pri-
oritization of deregulatory and economically neoliberal policies 
(highlighted prominently during the management of the Euro cri-
sis) have been ongoing sources of concern. 
Are these challenges to national liberal constitutionalism 
intrinsic to the process of EU supranational governance, and an 
inevitable consequence of the project of transnational integra-
tion? I suggest that while some of the challenges posed by EU su-
pranational governance to national constitutionalism are indeed 
intrinsic to the process of European integration, certain aspects 
of this challenge are not necessarily a negative development. In 
particular, the challenges posed to national constitutionalism and 
national constitutional identity by Europe-wide liberal constitu-
tionalism can and in some cases have created a constructive dia-
logue between the European Union and national judiciaries about 
the meaning and scope of a given constitutional right, taking into 
account the distinctive transnational context of the European 
Union. For some of the other challenges, however, and in partic-
ular the risk of executive dominance and unresponsive techno-
cratic governance, there is a real need for reflection and reform at 
both the level of national government and at the EU level. 
As far as the challenge of unconditional and judicially deter-
mined EU supremacy over domestic constitutional rights is con-
cerned, a great deal has already been written about constitutional 
pluralism in the European Union and the ability of national con-
stitutional courts not to follow the rulings of the ECJ when they 
are considered to threaten or undermine fundamental provisions 
of the domestic constitutional order.100 At the same time, the dev-
elopment of greater trust between the ECJ and domestic consti-
tutional courts would help in handling those cases in which an 
apparent conflict between EU law and national constitutional 
rights is at stake. Greater trust could encourage appropriate def-
erence on the part of the ECJ in those cases in which an important 
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national constitutional right is at issue rather than being instru-
mentally invoked to avoid the application of EU law; thus, the 
ECJ should pay close attention to the domestic values at stake 
and the reason for the domestic court’s interpretation of a partic-
ular provision. It should also, however, help national constitu-
tional courts to accept that membership in the European Union 
has entailed a change to the national constitutional order and 
that in some cases national constitutional law will have to adapt 
to the new, transnational liberal constitutional order created by 
the European Union. Hence the creation of liberal constitutional 
order at the EU level has entailed a challenge to liberal constitu-
tional orders at the national level, and this challenge is indeed 
intrinsic to the project of European integration, but it does not 
need to be seen as a negative development. 
As far as the weakness in the democratic responsiveness of 
the European Union and the tendency toward executive domi-
nance, these are more serious problems and a challenge that ur-
gently needs to be addressed. Most of the official reform proposals 
that have been contemplated in recent years have centered on 
further strengthening of the role of the European Parliament, or 
in some cases minor enhancement of the role of national parlia-
ments in the EU process. But such reforms are unlikely to address 
the entrenched problems of the unresponsiveness of EU govern-
ance institutions,101 or to take sufficiently seriously the Lisbon 
Treaty’s newly articulated commitment to EU democratic princi-
ples.102 The EU institutions—but also, it must be said, the govern-
ments of the member states themselves—have been notably am-
bivalent about more innovative proposals for involving civil 
society in European governance and deepening the democratic re-
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sponsiveness of the European Union, despite the range of inter-
esting and ambitious suggestions that have been made in recent 
years.103 
A willingness to undertake such reforms necessarily entails 
some risk, given the growth of popular opposition to the European 
Union in recent years, and given how EU political leaders have 
come to fear the use of devices like popular referenda. On the 
other hand, the development of direct, deliberative, and grass-
roots forms of engagement is crucial to build genuine democratic 
support for the EU project and to enable real participation on the 
part of the governed in the shape of EU governance. Such initia-
tives should not be considered as alternatives to but as supple-
ments to the existing elements of representative democracy 
within the European Union. A process of reform needs to go be-
yond top-down or superficial forms of consultation or consent 
seeking based on already-completed proposals drawn up by pre-
selected groups, and needs to be genuinely open to novel and even 
challenging ideas. Importantly, as others have pointed out, such 
democratic engagement and reform should not be undertaken 
merely in order to bolster the legitimacy and acceptability of pre-
viously taken steps of European integration.104 It is true that the 
project of opening the EU governance process more to such par-
ticipatory forms of democratic engagement and contestation car-
ries risks, not just the risk of challenging “the constitutive is-
sues,”105 but also the risk of unmanageable governance in an 
already very complex system. Yet these are risks that need to be 
taken, if reforms are carefully designed with the risks in mind so 
as to strengthen European democratic and constitutional govern-
ance rather than undermine it. A willingness to engage in deeper 
democratic consultation and reform would also mean the European 
Union confronting the third of the challenges articulated above, 
namely the increasingly widespread opposition to the European 
Union’s prioritization of economic integration over social goals 
and, more generally, to the sense that the policies of austerity 
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pursued in the management of the Euro crisis have undermined 
social democracy and other domestic welfare and constitutional 
commitments. 
To conclude, the project of supranational European integra-
tion clearly challenges the functioning of liberal constitutional de-
mocracy at the national level in various ways and, to some extent, 
has posed challenges to the functioning of democracy that liberal 
constitutionalism is designed to protect. Some of these challenges 
are inevitable to a project of continent-wide integration and su-
pranational governance, and some of them are positive challenges 
to particularist elements of national constitutionalism posed by 
the development of a system of liberal constitutionalism on this 
continent-wide scale. However, the lack of adequate democratic 
responsiveness of EU institutions, and the preference of member-
state governments for executive dominance at the supranational 
level are dangerous problems for the European Union. Their ad-
verse effects on domestic constitutional democracies require seri-
ous and committed reform, if the spread not just of Euroscepticism 
but also of illiberal and authoritarian political forces in EU mem-
ber states is to be tackled. Professor Timothy Garton Ash sug-
gested recently that if the opposite of populism within the nation-
state context is pluralism,106 then the opposite of populism 
within the European context is the European Union itself.107 The 
European Union at its best represents a response to Professor 
Dani Rodrik’s globalization trilemma—which posits that we can-
not simultaneously have deep economic integration, democratic 
politics, and national sovereignty, because one of the three must 
give108—in its creation of a system of supranational governance in 
which the challenges to national constitutional democracies are 
compensated for by a democratically responsive system of liberal 
constitutionalism at the European level. But if it is indeed to meet 
the challenge of Rodrik’s trilemma, and to meet the powerful chal-
lenges posed by the rise of populism in the European Union, the 
European Union must take very seriously the need for democratic 
and social reform and renewal of the European project. 
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